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Abstract
Although elections are fundamental to democratic consolidation by peacefully electing people to
serve in public offices, in many cases they not only bring along ideological contestations but also
interparty violent conflicts. Based on a Participatory Action Research (PAR) design, this paper
presents field-based lessons on training conducted to curb interparty electoral conflict prior to
August 2016 general elections held in Zambia. The study comprised 521 participants from nine
political parties which contested in 2016 general elections. Party officials were purposely
selected from their provincial, district and constituency level hierarchy. The study aimed at
understanding causes for interparty political violence and identifying solutions to address the
same. Findings show that major drivers of political violence in Zambia include a deep-rooted
“tradition” of practicing politics of intimidation to gain political mileage, political players’
ignorance about electoral laws, weak law enforcement, and poverty (an element that drives the
desire to earn a living from any opportunity). Unemployed youths are particularly vulnerable and
are abused by the political elites to fan violence at a small fee. The study affirms the importance
of action research as a useful bottom-up strategy for conflict prevention, especially in illiberal
democracies in Africa.

Keywords: Participatory Action Research; Conflict Prevention; Electoral Conflicts; Democratic
Consolidation; political violence, Zambia
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Introduction
Elections play a critical part in consolidating democracy. On one hand, they allow
political candidates to sell their ideological and policy options to voters; on the other hand, they
offer an opportunity to the electorate to freely analyze options presented to them and participate
in choosing their preferred political representatives. Through democratic elections, political
leaders gain legitimacy and acceptance to govern. While free and fair elections are preferred and
promoted, the terrain on electoral campaigns is a highly contested space, especially in emerging
democracies. Although the “Third-Wave of Democracy” (Huntington, 1991) of the 1990s
transformed the political space in Sub-Saharan African countries, some scholars (Rakner and
Svåsand, 2005) argue that several of these countries, including Zambia, have remained stuck in
transition and experienced a “transition paradigm” with a stunted democratic culture (Collier,
1999; Carothers, 2002). In part, this stunting becomes evident during electoral cycles, which are
characterized by violent contests among contesting political parties, individual political players,
their supporters and the citizenry before, during and after elections. The quest to quench and
possibly eliminate political violence currently associated with elections has, therefore,
increasingly become necessary.
Located in a previously politically turbulent southern African region, Zambia, now a
product of the third-wave of democratisation (Baylies and Szeftel, 1992; Rakner and van de
Walle, 2009), has generally remained a bastion of peace since attaining its political independence
in 1964. However, with the return to multiparty democracy in 1991, incidences of violent
interparty electoral conflicts have increased both in their occurrence and intensity. Over time,
growing concern has reflected the need for electoral conflict prevention before, during and after
elections. Not only is conflict prevention cheaper, more importantly it offers better chances for
dialogue among groups or parties in disagreement, thus creating space for arriving at win-win
solutions. In this context, conflict prevention helps to create harmonious human interactions and
prevents conflict from escalating into full blown wars. Even the United Nations (UN) embraces
conflict prevention as an important intervention tool. This is evident, for instance, in the UN’s
Charter and its commitment to “preventive diplomacy” espoused by Dag Hammarskjöld, the
second UN Secretary General (Ackermann, 2003, p. 340), and Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s “Agenda
for Peace” in 1992 (Boutros-Ghali, 1996). The UN, international financial institutions, bilateral
aid agencies and even international non-governmental organizations have all incorporated
bottom-up strategies into their existing programs (Ramsbotham, et al., 2005, pp. 221-222) to
reinforce Foucault’s notion of governing by transforming individual prejudices into cordial
relations amongst “ordinary people” as a way of attaining comprehensive peacebuilding (Curle,
1994; Lederach, 1995). Bottom-up interventions build relationships that construct peaceful
interactions and these prove to be more sustainable than the usual international peacemaking and
peacebuilding policies that focus on political elites and institutional reform. As Zartman (2005)
confirmed from his study that conflict prevention is always better and cheaper than mobilizing
troops for peacekeeping missions after war has ravaged an area and caused damage to property,
human life and human relations. Rebuilding any society that has been through a war is a costly
undertaking, hence the need for proactive actions through conflict prevention. This reality
inspired undertaking this study, which sought to find out why political party cadres in Zambia
fight, especially during presidential contests. Interparty electoral fights have set other countries
on fire in Africa (e.g. Cote d’Ivoire, Burundi, Kenya, Sudan, etc.), and if not addressed, Zambia
could follow the same political trajectory. To this effect, this study explored the question: What
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are the causes of political violence in Zambia? And how can this problem be resolved? What are
the solutions?
In addressing this question, a participatory action research (PAR) approach is used to
collect information from political party leaders, who are both perpetuators and victims of
interparty political violence, depending on who “wins” or “loses” in the conflict. As an approach
which uses bottom-up techniques to solve societal problems, PAR was found suitable for this
research based on the assumption that political players (as perpetuators of violence) are better
placed to explain why they fight (engage in interparty political violence) and would equally be
well positioned to prescribe solutions to address this problem (Whyte, 1989).
The study rides on relative deprivation theory (RDT) which posits that when people feel
deprived, they are most likely to resort to or support violent means of claiming what they
perceive as having been taken away from them (Hegre, Østby and Raleigh, 2009). This study
uses a social psychological concept and middle-range relative deprivation theory to undergird the
argument for a bottom-up to conflict prevention. In addition, the study also draws on
organizational behaviour and group dynamics which explain why people behave the way they do
(Olson, 1971). This paper agrees with arguments advanced by deprivation theorists, social
psychologists and political science experts on organisational behaviour and group dynamics who
argue, among other things, that: i) disadvantaged groups are more likely to support insurgents
and political violence to fight against their relative deprivation (Hegre, et al., 2009); ii) people
belong to organisations to accrue benefits from their memberships; and iii) group dynamics push
people to behave in a particular way, sometimes against their individual objective thinking
(Olson, 1971). Two major contributions that come out of this research are that a bottom-up
approach is more sustainable in conflict prevention and its resolution, and PAR can effectively
be utilized to promote positive behaviour change among political players which may lead to the
desired peaceful societal interactions.
Brief Historical Context
Zambia has had six democratically elected presidents2 since 1964. Mr David Kenneth
Kaunda, the first republican president, served the longest term of 27 years in office, a term of
office he perpetuated by introducing a one-party state through a constitutional amendment of 25th
August, 1973, which marked the beginning of a Second Republic (1973-1990). 1964-1973
represents a First Republic. Following Zambia’s economic meltdown in the 1980s and
government’s failure to uphold human rights, Zambians advocated for a return to multi-party
politics to reclaim their basic freedoms. Hence, in December 1990, a constitutional amendment
re-introduced multi-party politics, thus ushering in a Third Republic (1990 to date). David
Kaunda was ousted via a ballot box on 31st October, 1991, and Frederick Titus Chiluba of the
Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) became the second republican president. Since
then all presidents have served Zambia within prescribed constitutional term limits, except when
death of an incumbent president necessitated holding by-elections, e.g. when Levy Mwanawasa
and Michael Chilufya Sata passed on in 2008 and 2014, respectively. In both cases, Zambians
went to the polls to elect a new president to complete that term of office. Hence, Zambia appears
to have had too many presidential elections in short successions: 2006; 2008 (after Mwanawasa’s
death), 2011 (end of Mwanawasa’s five-year term, 2006-2011); 2015 (after Sata’s death in
2014), and then 2016 (end of Sata’s five-year term, 2011-2016). However, a 2016 constitutional
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amendment eliminated the need for presidential by-elections; it introduced a presidential running
mate who will automatically take over should the incumbent president die in office.
A point worth highlighting is that although Edgar Lungu continued to serve from his first
term into his second term, constitutionally his first term of office ended on 19th August 2016, a
day when the UPND filed in an election petition at the Constitutional Court to challenge 2016
general election results. This is based on a constitutional provision which stipulates that if there
is an election petition, an incumbent president shall vacate office and Speaker of the National
Assembly shall act as republican president until the case is disposed off (Section 104).
“Section 104(3) Where an election petition is filed against the incumbent, under Article
103 (1), or an election is nullified, under Article 103(3)(b), the Speaker shall perform the
executive functions, except the power to—
(a) make an appointment; or
(b) dissolve the National Assembly”
(GRZ, Act No. 2 of 2016)
Although political violence in Zambian politics is not new, being one of the reasons
advanced for introducing a one party state in 1973 to curb political violence based on tribal lines
(Habasonda, 2018), it has been noted that since 2010 political violence has increased both in
occurrence and number of people affected.3 A deadly encounter witnessed in Mufumbwe
parliamentary by-election in 2010 between MMD and UPND supporters spoke volumes; that
encounter left nine people badly injured and hospitalized (FODEP, 2010). Since then, this trend
has worsened, especially during general elections.
On 20th September, 2011, Zambia held its general elections and Michael Sata, a 74-yearold veteran politician from Patriotic Front (PF), who rode an anti-Chinese campaign, won the
presidential elections defeating incumbent President Rupiah Banda from MMD. Unfortunately,
Mr Sata’s tenure was short lived—he died in office on 28 October 2014 and this triggered a
presidential by-election to fill the vacancy within 90 days, as Article 38 (1) of the Zambian
Constitution stipulates. Mr Sata’s death ignited serious successor infighting within the ruling PF.
After a violent intra-party nomination process Mr. Edgar Lungu (current Zambian president) was
declared duly elected by the courts as PF nominee for president. Winner of this by-election was
to serve a one-year remainder of the term. A presidential by-election was held on 20 January
2015, with Lungu defeating Hakainde Hichilema of the UPND by a narrow margin of 27,757
votes or 1.66% (ECZ, 2015). However, the losing candidate, Mr. Hichilema, was magnanimous
enough to accept election results, though he denounced the elections as a sham and urged his
supporters to remain calm and prepare for 2016 general elections. With another general election
hard on the heels in 2016 and given the narrow margin between winner and loser in 2015 byelection, this voting pattern not only heightened the urgency to mobilize the electorate but also
deepened political tensions between PF and UPND; instances of localized electoral violence
became common, largely perpetuated by PF party cadres who had an aura of being in charge and
above the law. Political violence was increasingly elevated by media coverage, police bias, and
legal restrictions which heavily favoured the ruling PF, thus making the political landscape
extremely uneven for other political parties (U.S. Department of State, 2015; 2016). Clashes
between the PF and opposition supporters moved from verbal exchanges to physical
confrontation and in some instances even involved use of firearms and other lethal crude
weapons such as pangas (machetes). The death of Mapenzi Chibulo, a UPND supporter shot and
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killed on 9 July 2016 by security forces who clashed with opposition supporters protesting
against cancellation of a UPND rally in Lusaka (U.S. Department of State 2016, p.2), highlighted
government brutality against its own people. Never before had Zambians experienced such
political violence as that witnessed in 2015 and 2016 in the run up to 2016 general elections.
The 2015 presidential by-election was highly contested and marked a sad shift in
Zambia’s politics; people voted on regional lines of east and north versus south and west,4 which
by extension also reflected tribal voting. The east and northern region predominantly voted for
PF, while the south and western region voted for UPND. This trend was repeated in 2016 general
elections (Error! Reference source not found.), confirming the development of a divided
Zambia. 2016 general elections earned a slot history as a year when politicians managed to
divide Zambia on tribal lines – Easterners (where PF Party president comes) voted with their
tribal cousins in the north, while Southerners (where UPND president comes) voted with their
tribal cousins from western and northwest regions of Zambia.
Figure 1: Voting Pattern of Zambia’s 2016 General Elections

Tribal voting
splits Zambia
back into its
previous known
colonial spheres
of North-east
and North-west
Rhodesia.

If Zambia has
gone this far in
its tribal-based
alliances, the
2021 general
elections can be
predicted to be
not only tribal,
but bloody

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Zambia_general_election

This voting pattern stands in contrast with 1991 general elections, when Zambians united
to end a one-party state under the United National Independence Party (UNIP) of Kenneth
Kaunda and unanimously voted to re-introduce multi-party politics. Only Eastern Province
supported retention of UNIP (Figure 2), possibly because of their connection with UNIP’s party
president, who hailed from Malawi and was perceived as belonging to their Chewa-Nyanja
speaking group. In addition, this eastern vote could be linked to their identity with Kaunda’s wife
(Betty), who came from Eastern Province. Ten years later in 2001, the voting pattern reflects
dynamics of multi-party politics in Zambia with MMD and UPND emerging as two front runners
(Figure 2). MMD won 2001 general elections against contentious allegations that UPND won the
elections, as observed by local and international election monitors who cited serious
irregularities ranging from vote rigging to MMD’s improper use of state resources. In January
2002, three opposition candidates petitioned the Supreme Court to overturn MMD’s victory and
this case was finally disposed in February 2005 in favor of MMD.
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Figure 2: Zambia: 1991 and 2001 General Elections Voting Patterns

Source: http://lightonphiri.org/blog/historical-regional-voting-pattern-in-past-zambiapresidential-elections
Against this sad background, experts in peace and conflict studies found it imperative to get
in the political space to understand why political players had thrown civility to the wind. They
sought to understand causes of political violence from political players themselves and to solicit
their views on how to resolve political violence in Zambia and bring the country back to its
peaceful nature. Their motivation rides on the fact that “since wars begin in the minds of men
and women, it is in the minds of men and women that the defences of peace must be
constructed” (UNESCO, 1945—preamble to UNESCO’s Constitution).
From a backdrop of a highly competitive and contentious January 2015 presidential byelection to pre-election campaigns for 2016 general elections in Zambia, this paper shares fieldbased experience on the efficacy of Participatory Action Research (PAR) for electoral conflict
prevention. This experience is based on the August 2016 Zambian general elections.
This paper argues that using PAR for conflict prevention and resolution is likely to yield
more tangible results because, as a bottom-up approach, the PAR processes brings affected
people together to identify problems and prescribe solutions to resolve those problems. The
interactions promote local ownership of problem-solving and tend to be sustainable (Whyte,
1989). Political rivalry is curtailed because all agree to channel and resolve their differences
constructively. We argue that the true nature of conflict prevention is achieved by using the
strengths of participatory organizational self-assessment in which subjects of the study
“participate with the professional researcher throughout the research process, from the initial
design to the final presentation of the results and discussion of their action implications” (Whyte
1989, pp. 368-9). In this case, research participants interacted with researchers for three weeks,
sharing their insights on causes of political violence and also offering solutions to the problem.
Aim and Objectives of the Study
The long-term goal of this study was to start building a critical mass of peace envoys
within the rank and file of political party players, people equipped with knowledge and necessary
skills in conflict prevention and peaceful intra- and interparty electoral conflict resolution
strategies. In this regard, the research addressed a desire to inculcate good morals that respond to
the national electoral code of conduct (GRZ, 2011) as well as internationally accepted electoral
best practices. In the short term, the objectives were five-fold:
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1. To enhance interactions and facilitate relationship-building among cadres from different
political parties.
2. To promote an understanding that every person has an important role to play in the
political space.
3. To impress upon participants that divergent views do not translate into enmity.
4. To promote respect for and protection of human rights in the political space.
5. To build relationships useful for national development.
Research Design
The study utilized a PAR approach, whose unique strength comes from inclusion of the
community or affected people in finding solutions to their problems. PAR has long been
recognised for its potential to transform communities because it uses a bottom-up approach and
location specific interventions which are mutually agreed upon by affected communities. In
conflict prevention and peacebuilding, PAR stands as a critical tool for healing fractured
relations and creating peaceful communities (Banks, 2013; Harris, 2017; International Alert,
2017; Kaye, 2017; De Koning & Martin (Eds.), 1996). PAR emphasizes active community
involvement in finding solutions to its problems. It rides on a well-documented principle that
local ownership assures success and sustainability of interventions agreed upon. Furthermore, the
participatory nature of PAR promotes knowledge exchange within and between communities
(e.g. universities, policy-making or other research and service delivery institutions) (Banks, et.
al., 2013) and, therefore, helps to develop knowledge, get commitments from all parties involved
regarding the issue at hand, as well as teaching skills necessary for working together
harmoniously. In essence, PAR produces empowered and harmonious communities. It was
against this background that the study sought to understand causes to interparty political conflict
and violence in Zambia by engaging political leaders from contesting parties at provincial,
district and constituent level to find solutions to problems affecting them. Hence, PAR design
was adopted for this study.
The purpose of this study was to help reduce interparty political violence prior to August
2016 general elections in Zambia. A two way approach was envisioned: first, to find out (from
political leaders) why they fight in the political space (understand root causes to interparty
political violence in Zambia) and with their help, find solutions to that problem, assuming local
ownership of agreed upon interventions will have higher chances of success than solutions
prescribed by outsiders (Banks, 2013; Kaye & Harris, 2017).
The research initially targeted political party leaders from 5 of the 10 provinces in
Zambia which, due to media reports on political violence, were considered areas of concern.
These provinces were: Central, Copperbelt, Lusaka, Southern and Western provinces. The
research classified the Zambian political terrain into two categories. The first category was those
provinces which reported high incidences of political violence, hence classified as “hot spots”
(Aniekwe & Kushie, 2011). The other provinces were classified based on their relative calmness
or less violence. More research participants were drawn from areas considered as hot spots, and
fewer from areas of less concern (Table 1). This research took place from 18th July to 6th August
2016, ending just a week before general elections took place on 11th August 2016. Study
participants were purposely selected by their respective political parties based on their positions
in the party, and were drawn from three levels of party hierarchy, namely: provincial, district and
constituency levels. The rationale for this selection was to build an inclusive team of participants
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who would influence their political cadres and sympathisers at different levels of their
communities. This process responds to Paul Lederach’s comprehensive conflict transformation
approach to peace-building, which involves communities (Lederach, 1995; Lederach, 1997), as
well as to PAR core principles which advocate for local communities to find solutions to their
problems (Banks, 2013; Harris, 2017; International Alert, 2017; Kaye, 2017; De Koning &
Martin (Eds.), 1996). According to Lederach’s approach, the aim is to identify representative
individuals or groups in the middle-range level and empower them with mediation skills and
other peace-building measures that can be used to address conflict in their localities. Middlerange managers occupy a very strategic space in the sense that they “sit” between the community
and senior managers and this gives them space and opportunity to influence people’s thinking
below and above their position. This research rides on this principle, to empower political party
officials with conflict prevention skills which would later be used in their respective
communities. The PAR process served as a form of training for participants to: i) understand
causes of political violence, ii) how to prevent conflict and, iii) to empower them with skills and
knowledge on how to transform political actors into peace envoys in their communities.
Based on the preponderance of clientelistic violent conflicts associated with presidential
elections, participants were drawn from 9 political parties contesting for a presidential position in
2016 general elections. It was assumed, based on previous experiences, that these nine political
parties had higher chances of engaging in political violence to seek support for their presidential
candidate than those who were only participating at parliamentary, mayoral and councillor level
positions. The study followed a four-phase sequence of action research: first, planning actions /
interventions to improve practice; second, acting to implement planned improvement; third,
describing and monitoring effects of actions; and fourth, evaluating outcomes of actions.
Research participants also applied this cycle during practical sessions when they were
asked to generate solutions to address root causes to political violence in Zambia (Figure 3).
Target Group
The research targeted to reach 600 political party leaders from nine political parties who
fielded presidential candidates. However, only 521 people participated in this study, yielding
86.83% success rate. Considering that this study was undertaken one month before 2016 general
elections when most political players were out on their campaign trails, this participation rate is
deemed to be quite high and reasonably encouraging. Also, participants’ representation from all
levels (provincial, district and constituent levels) was quite high.
Training sessions were interactive, participatory, practical, and focused on problemsolving. In other words, the training was results oriented. In order to prevent information
overload for participants drawn from lower levels of the political party hierarchy, research
participants were put into three separate groups, representing party officials at provincial, district
and constituent levels. Each group had two days’ interactions held in five provincial locations:
Mongu (Western Province only); Livingstone (Southern Province only); Lusaka (Lusaka
Province also included people from Eastern Province); Kabwe (Central Province, which included
participants from Muchinga and Northern Provinces); and Kitwe, (Copperbelt Province, which
also catered for participants from Luapula and North-Western Provinces). Each two-day session
comprised approximately 120 participants. Working with smaller groups was found desirable
because interactions in small groups tend to be more effective than larger groups and it is also
easier to achieve group consensus (Olson, 1971). However, a balance had to be found to make
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groups big enough to avoid effects of social pressure and social incentives, both of which are
pervasive in very small groups (Olson, 1971). Nonetheless, the self-serving character of
individuals can also tip the balance of group dynamics in any social setting. And this is more true
in Zambian politics where focus on partisan (and individual) benefits outweighs emphasis on the
public good.
Overall, 521 political party leaders from 9 political parties participated in this research,
which provided practical training in conflict prevention, analysis, mediation and negotiation. Out
of this number, 124 participants (33.40%) were women while 347 (66.60%) were men. It was not
surprising that women’s representation was low because Zambian politics is still very much a
male-dominated arena with very few women in leadership positions. For instance, currently
Zambia has 18.8% women parliamentarians compared to 81.2% men (Zambian Parliament,
2016). In fact, this trend originates from party structures where women are mainly relegated to
being praise singers and not given equal opportunity with their male counterparts to hold party
positions. The situation is not different even at local government level where there are 132
female councillors across the country, compared to 1,323 male councillors (Ministry of Gender,
2018, p. 8). Table 1 gives a summary of participants from each province, broken down by
gender.
Table 1: Number of Research Participants from each Province

PROVINCE
1
2
3
4
5

CENTRAL1
COPPERBELT1
LUSAKA1
SOUTHERN
WESTERN

LEVEL
Provincia District Constituency
l
33
40
50
36
38
32
40
32
40
30
30
30
38
52
TOTAL

GENDER
Female
Male
40
37
48
26
23
174

83
69
64
64
67
347

TOTAL
123
106
112
90
90
521

1

The locations below accommodated participants from other provinces as follows:
Central Province: 23 people from Muchinga (10) & Northern (13) provinces joined their
colleagues in Kabwe.
Copperbelt Province: 16 officials from Luapula (8) & Northwestern (8) provinces went to
Kitwe.
Lusaka Province: 22 people from Eastern Province participated in Lusaka.
Conflict Theory
Conflict theory seeks to scientifically explain in general how conflict starts and varies, and
the effects it brings in society. In its main argument, conflict theory concerns itself with unequal
distribution of scarce resources and power, using Weber’s three systems of stratification (theory
of stratification) based on class, status, and power (Weber, 1947), where power is seen as the
central feature of society. According to Weber (1947), conflict does not involve the economy to
the extreme, but the state and economy together set up conditions for conflict. And it is these
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conditions that society either embraces or reacts to—peacefully or violently. In the case at hand,
people are reacting to what they consider as unfair conditions and treatment.
This study uses a social psychological concept and middle range relative deprivation
theory (RDT) to undergird the argument for a bottom-up approach to conflict prevention. The
theory of relative deprivation proposes that people view their well-being as being worse when
individuals perceive themselves to be worse off than their comparison or reference group, then
they feel relatively deprived (Hegre, Østby and Raleigh, 2009). According to Hegre et al.,
(2009), people in locations that are “relatively poor and are marginalised by the central
government should be more likely to support and join a rebel group that works to topple the
government” (Hegre, Østby and Raleigh 2009, p. 600).
The theory of relative deprivation (Hegre, Østby and Raleigh, 2009) seems to confirm
people’s feelings in this study on their perception of government’s performance regarding its
application of basic democratic principles in Zambia (Table 3). Participants from the Patriotic
Front (the party in government) rated government highly on all items while those from
opposition parties expressed dissatisfaction in all areas. And both groups gave reasons for their
assessment. This is not surprising because people aligned to the Party in government tend to
access all the benefits, e.g. getting government contracts, soft treatment or being shielded
(protected) when found on the wrong side of the law, etc. As a result, they do not feel
government’s weight while those in opposition are constantly in check. Indeed, such treatment
totally defeats democratic ethos which, among other things, demands fairness, equity,
accountability, transparency and applying the rule of law. Departure from any of these
parameters introduces unfair treatment and consequently becomes a source of conflict. Based on
observations from this study, unfair conditions force people in opposition parties to engage in
political violence to fight for their rights because the political playing field favors the party in
government against other Zambians. For example, Zambia Police segregate in their application
of the Public Order Act. Notices for meetings from opposition parties are in most cases not
supported, and when applicants go ahead with their meeting, the same police go to disrupt those
meetings. But the party in government hold their meetings even without giving a notice to the
police. Another example relates to driving on the wrong side of the road. During political
campaigns, it is common practice for the party in control of government to take over roads and
drive even on the wrong side of the road without any arrests or reprisal. Police stand aside and let
that level of hooliganism go unpunished. Yet, the same police are quick to arrest any other party
if they dare do the same thing. Unfair treatment sows seeds of resentment and makes people
react aggressively.
Study Outcomes
Researchers spent six days in each provincial centre to interact with research participants —
two days with each group representing provincial, district and constituency party officials. Using
PAR principles, and tapping into conflict prevention techniques (Lederach, 1995 & 1997),
research participants were put in groups which represented all parties and were assigned to do
conflict analysis using a Problem Tree approach and offer solutions (Lederach, 1995 & 1997;
Lund, 1996). This process entailed identifying root causes to political violence, show effects
from that violence, and then offer solutions to stop political violence. As people who either plan
or and execute their party’s involvement in political violence, this conflict analysis exercise
provided an opportunity for their individual and group introspection.
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Initially, some participants tried to use this process as a blame game in which certain
political parties (e.g. PF and UPND) were identified as major culprits perpetuating political
violence in Zambia. But after realizing that the process was about addressing political violence
as a common “enemy” and not individual entities, the analysis later helped to build relationships
in respective groups. This occurrence responds to expert observations which argue that if not
well handled, conflict analysis can itself generate a conflict. Instead of focusing on the problem,
people may start blaming each other and this usually generates hateful feelings and exacerbates
rather than reduces conflict (Galtung, 1996; Pruitt and Kim, 2004). However, when properly
executed, conflict analysis tends to bring harmony and mend broken relationships. Both of these
were achieved in this process. As Mancur Olson (1971) argued, group size matters; the smaller
the group size the easier it is to arrive at [consensus] decisions (p. 53-55). In this case, because
groups were small, and each group had no partisan majority (e.g., having more people from one
party) to tilt decisions in any party’s favour, most likely this made it easier to focus on the
problem rather than on partisan interests. And because conflict analysis had no room for seeking
political alliances (as in who wins), this in itself also eliminated any aspirations for collusion or
forming alliances. It is common behavior in politics to form alliances to accrue economic or
social benefits from some undertaking. Equally important is the aspect of social pressure in small
groups (Olson 1971, p. 62), as group members can easily be enticed to align themselves to a
particular way of thinking and, or decision. However, due to their composition, this approach
seems to have created what Mancur Olso (1971) calls “privileged” and “intermediate” groups,
which had both economic and social incentives that inspired them to “work towards achievement
of the collective goods” (p. 63). In their conflict analysis, research participants addressed a
common problem and, therefore, put their skills and expertise towards solving it, hence the
proposed interventions in Table 2.
Overall, this PAR enhanced political party leaders’ knowledge, skills and understanding in
conflict analysis, prevention, and transformation. Through this process, they were able to identify
root causes of political violence in Zambia, indicate the effects, and also offer solutions to this
problem using a bottom-up approach, location specific and with interventions mutually agreed
upon by themselves. The participants learned how to develop knowledge and get commitments
from all parties involved regarding the issue at hand, as well as skills necessary for working
together harmoniously. Having participated in this process, research participants committed to
apply civility in their political conduct. It was evident that this study would help reduce
interparty political violence because these political players now understood root causes to
political violence and offered solutions to address this problem. There was a general
understanding that electoral stakeholders must take a “zero-tolerance” approach to political
violence and election manipulation, both of which culminate in deceit and illegitimate office
bearers and ultimately lead to illegitimate government systems, which then become a bone of
contention and source of conflict. The section below reports key outcomes from this study.
Political Behaviour
Understanding the logic of group actions and objectives of their political behavior was a critical
element in this process. As Mancur Olson (1971) argues, actions taken by people in an
organization tend to reflect its values and their allegiance to that organisation. People decide to
belong to an organisation based on their belief that it will serve their individual and collective
interests.
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When asked why political parties in Zambia tend to employ violence during their
campaigns instead of peaceful strategies, 94% of participants confessed that this strategy was
designed to intimidate their opponents (and supporters) which then allows their party to advance
and increase their party’s chances of winning elections. Surprisingly, research participants did
not even reflect on how their actions impacted on the larger community; they only had a narrow
focus that their actions were designed to disrupt their political opponents’ chances to win. Some
people, especially unemployed youths, engaged in political violence for economic gain because
political parties (and aspiring candidates) paid for that service. However, some did that out of
loyalty to implement instructions from their party patrons, while others confessed total ignorance
even with respect to laws that prescribe how people should conduct themselves in the political
arena. It was surprising to note that about 95% of research participants did not know it was an
offence under the Electoral Code of Conduct to remove, tear or deface another party’s campaign
materials (GRZ, 2011). It was astonishing to encounter such a degree of ignorance (not to
mention illiteracy) on potential candidates likely to hold high positions in government, assuming
their party won the elections! How would such people manage the affairs of a country whose
laws they knew nothing about? In a way, this revelation also confirmed why they engage in
violence; they are ignorant ponies in the political space who only wait for instructions from their
party central committees on what activities to implement, and implement the same without
question. A similar trend was observed on their understanding of democratic principles where it
was observed that their knowledge was close to zero.
When participants were assigned a group exercise on conflict analysis to identify root causes of
political violence (rather than asking them why they fight) and to offer solutions that will address
the problem, they generated a long list of reasons (Table 2), most of which relate to poor
leadership (greedy, selfish, dishonesty, corrupt, dictatorial, unaccountable leaders); weak and
biased public institutions; segregation / discrimination (nepotism and tribalism); human rights
abuse; poverty; corruption; illiteracy and ignorant citizenry, especially on electoral laws; and
non-ideological parties.
This long list reflects not only so many potential areas of conflict that need to be
addressed, but also gives a measure of how little attention government and political parties have
given to this area. Strictly speaking, political parties should have taken political violence as an
area of concern, but because they use it as a tool towards achieving their goal, it ceases to be a
problem until they are on the receiving end of the effects from that violence, which sadly also
affects the larger community. Until political parties arrive at a point where they apply zerotolerance to political violence, it will take a long time to curb this scourge. However, this PAR
process gives hope to getting closer to that point. One way would be to intensify mass education
within and outside party hierarchy on the evils of political violence. More importantly, anyone
perpetuating political violence must be punished to the full extent of the law; no sacred cows.
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Table 2: Causes, Effects and Solutions to Political Violence from a PAR group exercise, Zambia.

1

2

3

4
5
6
7

8
9

ROOT CAUSES OF
POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Poor leadership
- Greedy, selfish, dishonesty,
corrupt, dictatorial leaders
- Non-transparent &
unaccountable leaders
- Abuse of power
- Non-patriotic leaders
- Vengeful (rather than
reconciliatory) leaders
Weak & biased public
institutions
- Biased Electoral Commission
of Zambia
- Mismanagement of the electoral
process
- Late announcement of election
results
- Selective application of the law
- Police brutality and bias
- Absence of / biased coverage
from public media
Nepotism & tribalism
- Hate speeches
- Patronage & politics of the
belly
Compromised judiciary
- Selective application of the law
Human rights abuse, e.g., police
brutality
Illiteracy/ignorant citizenry,
especially on electoral laws
Corruption
- Use illegal (financial)
resources
Poverty
Absence of party ideologies
- Lacks basis of party existence

EFFECTS5

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

➢ Anger, mob psychology,
violent behaviour
➢ Intra- & interparty fighting
➢ Riots due to unfair
treatment under the law
➢ Injury, loss of life
➢ Destruction of property
➢ Displacement of people,
forced migration
➢ Loss of credibility in public
institutions, e.g. Judiciary,
Electoral Commission and
electoral process
➢ Illegitimate election results
➢ Tribalism, racial
discrimination & divisions
in society
➢ Promotes hateful feelings
➢ Vulgar, hateful language
➢ Broken homes & societies,
traumatized communities
➢ Weak economy, lack of
development
➢ Economic imbalances
across regions
➢ Unjustified, selective
arrests/ law enforcement
➢ Claims on territorial control

➢ Ethical, honest,
transparent,
accountable, & patriotic
leaders who are publicservice driven
➢ Good governance
➢ An independent
Judiciary
➢ An independent
Electoral Commission
➢ Security sector reforms
➢ Respect for human
rights
➢ Tolerance of divergent
views
➢ Apply rule of law at all
times
➢ Equal distribution of
resources and power
➢ Dialogue, not fights
➢ Embrace One Zambia
One Nation Motto in its
true meaning
➢ Party Constitutions to
spell out Party Ideology
(not copy & paste)
➢ Positive political
statements from leaders
➢ Stop transporting
political cadres to other
provinces where they do
not reside.
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As noted above, 94% of political party cadres engaged in violence out of ignorance; they
had no clue what democracy means, and worse still what national electoral laws stipulate.
Therefore, one area that needs immediate attention is stakeholder education in democracy and
human rights, as well as electoral laws and conduct.
Opposition political parties complained that in most cases, violence is initiated by the
party in government who had both government machinery and other resources to traverse the
country at will. And sadly, no one has been punished for engaging in violence in all places where
political violence occurred simply because the major culprit was the PF. This selective
application of the law is not sitting well with other parties, including the affected communities
who lost property and life in such encounters. One wonders how these communities might react
one day to what is perceived as government insensitivity in putting a stop to political violence.
Hopefully, the Commission of Inquiry into Voting Patterns and Electoral Violence,6 whose
report the country awaits, will offer lasting solutions to this problem.
Regarding political leaders’ understanding of democratic principles, all participants
portrayed partisan inclination in their analysis of national issues. Patriotic Front (PF) Party
officials supported government in everything it was doing, whereas participants from opposition
parties only had words of condemnation for government actions in all areas (Table 3).
Table 3: Democracy Check in Zambia

DEMOCRACY FUNCTIONALITY

1
2
3
4
5
6

Our democracy gives people freedoms
People are FREE to express themselves
We allow and accept divergent views
Relies on majority rule
Leaders are accountable to the electorate
Our democracy applies the rule of law

PERCEPTION SCORE (%)
Party in Govt
Opposition
(Patriotic Front)
Parties7
100%
95%
95%
100%
90%
100%

40%
30%
0%
0%
10%
5%

PF officials defended their party as doing a great job in upholding democratic principles in
Zambia while participants from the opposition political parties catalogued the PF government’s
failures as systematically killing democracy, which agrees with observations noted about the
Zambian democracy by Baylies and Szeftel (1992) and Goldring and Wahman (2016).
Considering the relationship between members and their organisation, it was not surprising
to see their allegiance expressed in their analysis of various issues. Despite the fact that all were
personal assessments and secret, yet results showed that people were influenced internally by
their party affiliations, which exerted internal social pressure and forced them to apply group
think rather than individual rational thinking. This is not surprising because in the political space,
political supporters’ thought process is captured by their party loyalty. They are more interested
in achieving their party interests rather than national interests. Suffice to say, major positive
outcomes from this participatory action research include the following:
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Reduced Political Violence
Feedback from research participants, as well as journalists who covered the process in various
locations, indicated that there was a reduction in political violence immediately after this
engagement. Political leaders who participated in this action research communicated to their
party cadres not to engage in violence. A good example of such a positive impact was a peaceful
campaign rally held by the United Party for National Development (UPND) in Kanyama
compound, Lusaka on 19th July 2016. This was the first political rally held after Electoral
Commission of Zambia (ECZ) lifted a campaign ban in Lusaka city, which was instituted to curb
political violence in the capital city. This rally would have been a bloody encounter because
alleged PF cadres had planned to disrupt it. Since PF officials were part of the participants at the
time, the PF team was politely requested by other party officials to intervene and show good
leadership. Hence, instructions were issued to PF supporters not to engage in political violence.
That day, the UPND political rally was peaceful, confirming that this interaction helped party
officials at different levels to reflect and reconsider their role: to promote peace, not political
violence.
Figure 3: Conflict Analysis on Causes of Political Violence

Group work enhanced interparty interactions. In this photo,
people presenting their group analysis came from PF (left),
UPND (the lady in the middle) and UNIP (right); all of them
in their respective party regalia.

In the post-training period, there was a general reduction in political violence and interparty
conflicts across the country. For instance, Mongu in Western Province, which recorded deadly
violent incidences in 2011 and 2015, and Mufumbwe in North-western Province, which also
experienced terrible interparty violence in 2011 elections, were both relatively peaceful during
2016 general elections.
An evaluation of the PAR process by party officials at the end revealed that everyone
greatly appreciated participating in this study; they confirmed having been empowered in
knowledge and skills for conflict prevention. They pointed out that most of them had limited
knowledge on electoral laws, human rights, and basic requirements for good governance and
democracy and how all of these applied to them. After watching documentaries about Rwanda
(1994 genocide) and Kenya (2007 political violence), they noted both with dismay and
appreciation how easily a country can go up in flames because of political intolerance; they
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could see themselves in that situation. Consequently, they pledged to uphold peace in their
political campaigns.
Although no follow-up research has been done after the 2016 elections to ascertain aftereffects of this PAR, a few calls received from some participants who expressed their appreciation
for the positive impact the PAR created in their respective political parties seems to suggest that
a good seed was planted from that process. Since behavior change tends to take a long time, one
only hopes that those few party officials who participated will take responsibility to influence
their colleagues to embrace civility in their political interactions.
Enhanced Knowledge and Skills
Participants confirmed that their knowledge on conflict resolution and peacebuilding was greatly
enhanced through this action research. In particular, they appreciated the interactive and handson approach which this research provided (Figure 3). Some participants confessed having
engaged in or perpetuated political conflict and violence out of ignorance. After this interaction,
they acknowledged having understood their roles and responsibilities and more importantly their
obligations as stipulated under the law (GRZ, 2016). A good number of trainees did not know it
was an offence under the Electoral Code of Conduct to tear apart other people’s campaign
materials (GRZ, 2011).
Mutual Respect for Coexistence
Participants acknowledged having understood the need for peaceful coexistence in a
political space, which entailed, among other things, acceptance of divergent views and choices,
respect for human rights (GRZ, 2011, Regulation 5 and 21), tolerance (Figure 5), and adhering to
the electoral code of conduct. Put simply, this meant upholding the rule of law in all their
activities. Furthermore, it was noted that because party regalia in Zambia is not sold but given
free, it does not necessarily indicate in any way that an individual who wears a party’s regalia
supports that particular party.
On the contrary, people get party regalia to be used as work suits when doing manual work,
as it saves them money. As one participant put it, “many voters in this election cycle are
watermelons,” meaning they are green outside pretending to support the PF (whose party color is
green) and yet they are truly red inside; their real allegiance is with the UPND (whose party
color is red), and that’s the party they will vote for. Hence, it was noted that they should be free
to wear any party regalia of their choice, even a combination of party regalia (
Figure 4). Beating up or intimidating people who wore another party’s regalia will not change
people’s decisions. Their choices remained secure and will be expressed on polling day.
Respect for Human Rights, and People’s Choices
This research also provided an opportunity for people from different political parties to
interact freely without intimidation from anyone. On the first day most participants exhibited
hostile attitudes towards people from so called “rival” parties. After first-day interactions,
antagonistic behaviour was eliminated and participants interacted freely with each other.
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Figure 4: Free to wear any party regalia of my choice.

Clad in various party regalia, a research participant demonstrates the degree of freedom
Zambians should enjoy in expressing their political choices and affiliations as articulated in
Part III of the national constitution which provides for the Bill of Rights.
In fact, on the second day of training, participants even wore their party regalia to emphasize that
everyone was free and entitled to enjoy their fundamental human rights and freedoms, as
enshrined in the national constitution, which includes, among other things: freedom of
movement, speech, expression, assembly and association, etc. (GRZ 1996, Part III).8 Every
person is entitled to protection under the law regardless of race, place of origin, political
opinions, color, creed, sex or marital status (GRZ 1996, Part II).9 During the run-up to 2015 and
2016 elections, people’s freedom of expression and association were completely curtailed. It was
common to see PF cadres harass or beat anyone who wore opposition party regalia and sadly, the
government seems to endorse this development as no one was punished for engaging in such
behavior. In return, when an opportunity arose, opposition party cadres who were deprived of
their basic human rights would reciprocate in a similar manner, thus creating a cycle of violence.
Developed Intra-party Relations
This PAR helped participants to create new friendships and expanded their networks; they
were able to call each other and stop violent activities planned by their cadres. In Lusaka and
Kabwe, participants agreed to hold road shows where all political parties would participate to
demonstrate that they were not enemies, but leaders looking for a vote to serve the Zambian
people. This was meant to emphasize the fact that people can hold divergent views but still
remain friends because each person was entitled to his/her opinions (Figure 5).
Civic Education to Society
The training program received wide coverage on public and private television and radio
stations, as well as print and electronic media. This media support helped disseminate
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information on conflict prevention to a wider community far beyond towns where this training
was conducted. It is also evident that this training program helped build a good image for ECZ,
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Dag Hammarskjöld Institute for
Peace and Conflict Studies. This partnership with the media should be strengthened to help build
a culture of peace in the political arena. News items on this training can be accessed from
respective media outlets.
Figure 5: Respect my Choice, it’s my right
One Zambia One Nation is a national Motto which
promotes national unity irrespective of political party
affiliations, tribal alliances or any other identity tags.
However, in the recent past, Zambian politicians have
tended to declare certain parts of the country as belonging
to their party and “no go” areas for other parties.
This photo, captured in one of the locations during 2016
general elections, depicts a PF supporter (left) and UPND
supporter (right) walking hand in hand as colleagues.
This is what all Zambians are yearning for – a One Zambia
One Nation – a place where people fully enjoy their human
rights, including freedom of assembly and association...

Discussion
Zambia has been a beacon of peace in the southern African region long before attaining its
political independence in 1964. For instance, the country played a pivotal role as a member of
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1963), serving as a key mining center; and
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) attracted workers from both Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and
Nyasaland (Malawi), which became useful in creating harmonious relationships between the
people of these three nations.
Later after independence Zambia again demonstrated its peaceful character through its
resolve to support peaceful political liberation efforts in the region. Zambian leaders strongly
believed in self-governance and committed to support political independence liberation efforts in
the southern African region, which culminated in all countries getting their political
independence, with South Africa being the last kid on the block in 1994. Zambia housed many
freedom fighters from the region, and borrowing from Mahatma Ghandi’s philosophy of nonviolence, placed emphasis on peaceful approaches in fighting for their political independence.
Freedom fighters from Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe all had
bases in Zambia, and now consider Zambia their first home before their countries became
independent.
After attaining its independence, Zambia also played a critical role in the formation of
regional bodies aimed at promoting peaceful interactions and coexistence of the people in the
region. Some of these bodies include: Southern African Development Coordinating Conference
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(SADCC) in 1980, later transformed into Southern African Development Community (SADC) in
1992; Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa in 1981, later transformed into the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1994—whose headquarters is
currently located in Lusaka, Zambia.
In the global arena, Zambia decided to be non-aligned to any geopolitical grouping and
remains a non-aligned nation to date. In a way, this has helped Zambia not to be entangled in
geopolitical issues that do not directly serve Zambia’s interests, and subsequently places the
country in a neutral position where it is able to serve as a mediator between nations and, or
groups in conflict.
Against this background of being a non-violent nation, an oasis of peace in the region, it
is disturbing to see Zambian politicians embrace violence in their operations. It is feared that
such behavior will erode Zambia’s peaceful character and possibly plunge the country into
chaos, or worse still, push it into being a failed state as evidence shows from what has happened
in other parts of Africa. Hence it became imperative to investigate what really was driving this
political violence in Zambia, and this PAR process documented a long list from political party
officials on what they thought were drivers of political violence. In a nutshell, two things came
out: 1. the party in power (Patriotic Front) wants to remain in power by all means necessary
(mainly using intimidation, violence, information blackout, manipulation, and abuse of power);
and 2. Opposition Parties were frustrated at the level of illegality perpetuated by the PF.
Participants attributed most causes of political violence as being practised by the PF and the
opposition is left with no other option but to reciprocate in a similar manner of applying force.
From their frustration, it was easy to notice that people were simply reacting to a situation in
which they felt deprived of many things, mainly bordering on their lack of civil and political
freedoms, and access to numerous resources and opportunities.
This research agrees with arguments advanced by deprivation theorists as well as political
science experts on organizational behaviour and group dynamics who argue, among other things,
that: i) disadvantaged groups are more likely to support insurgence and political violence to fight
against their relative deprivation (Hegre et al., 2009); ii) people belong to organisations to accrue
benefits from their membership; and iii) group dynamics push people to behave in a particular
way, sometimes against their individual objective thinking (Olson, 1971). It was evident from
this research that in its current state, Zambia’s political and electoral playing field is tilted in
favor of the PF (the party currently in power), thus depriving other political players of a level
playing field. This situation creates frustration, which leads to aggressive behavior, expressed
through political violence, which is a form of aggression. Goldring and Wahman (2016) also
noted similar observations (Ndulo, n.d.). In this context, frustration-aggression theory can also be
used to explain violent behavior. In terms of identifying catalysts of conflict, Berkowitz (1989)
explains that frustration-aggression theory ranks high on research on aggression. It has been used
to explain both human and animal behavior. The theory gives a macro approach to conflict and
argues that aggression comes as a result of blocking or frustrating a person’s effort to attain a
goal.
Furthermore, according to Hartogs and Artzt (1970), organized violence is patterned and
deliberate, and is therefore instrumental. It is a form of social combat usually exercised in the
context of group interests and goals. That is why electoral processes in Africa’s “new” or third
wave democracies have, with few exceptions, been characterized by violence. In Zambia, it can
be argued that rising electoral violence reflects deepening contestation for political power, weak
governance institutions, violent political parties and a largely ineffective electoral management
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structure (UNECA, 2013). Other factors include: absence of the rule of law and justice, denial of
human rights, lack of political representation for minority groups, ideological positions,
unemployment, poverty and rise in food prices, lack of accountability, poor governance and
weak judicial systems (World Bank, 2011). All these factors often lead to tension and eventually
aggressive behaviour.
Elections, being formal processes of selecting people for public office, play an important
role in propagating tenets of democracy and are key elements of democratic processes. Elections
provide means by which political competition in society is channelled into a constructive process
with common rules to choose people’s representatives. Robust democratic institutions are usually
understood as the ultimate guarantor for social peace. However, since electoral processes are
intrinsically about the attainment of political power, which are often high-stake contexts,
elections, as a process of competition for political power, quite often also become catalysts of
conflict. And if not well managed, this may lead to violent encounters between political
competitors, as has been the case in many African countries. 10 Violence rides on thoughts
because thoughts are actions; they start as passive reflections, become assertive and finally
manifest in aggressive behaviour. This study tried to arrest the situation by engaging political
players who carry this responsibility to embrace positive thinking and work for a better
tomorrow. War is a creation of man, and people have a choice to embrace peace.
Conclusion
This paper conveys results of a participatory action research (PAR) as an important tool for
understanding causes of political violence in Zambia and finding solutions to prevent the same.
Although there was scepticism that having political party leaders from nine different parties in
one place at the peak of their 2016 general election campaigns might degenerate into a blame
game that could spur antagonistic behavior and possibly interparty fights, on the contrary,
bringing these political players in one room provided them a peaceful space and an opportunity
to freely share their views on why they behave the way they do. Not only did these interactions
help them appreciate the need to uphold each other’s human rights, but more importantly, this
interaction served as an opportunity for self-introspection; accepting wrong-doing and
committing to become good leaders. Since political office has no permanent tenure, but operates
on a revolving door, this process reminded participants that they will reap rewards from their
actions long after leaving their positions. By engaging in political violence now political leaders
are essentially socializing the current young generation into becoming hooligans with no respect
for the rule of law, and when their chance comes to become leaders, these young people will
practice the same violence based on how they were socialized. At that point, current leaders will
become victims of bad behavior being inculcated now. For this reason, current political leaders
have a rare privilege to promulgate and enforce standards that promote and uphold civility and
human dignity in all human interactions. It is easier to destroy something than to build it;
political violence was a good recipe for destroying Zambia’s peace and community tranquillity.
Hence, leaders should always aim at building peaceful communities who uphold and respect
human rights and will enforce the rule of law in Zambia at all times.
Findings from this research agrees with arguments advanced by deprivation theorists as
well as political science experts on organizational behaviour and group dynamics who argue,
among other things, that: i) disadvantaged groups are more likely to support insurgence and
political violence to fight against their relative deprivation (Hegre et al., 2009); ii) people belong
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to organisations to accrue benefits from their membership; and iii) group dynamics push people
to behave in a particular way, sometimes against their individual objective thinking (Olson,
1971). It was evident that in its current state, Zambia’s political and electoral playing field
favours the PF (the party controlling government), thus depriving other political players of a
level playing field. This situation creates frustration, which leads to aggressive behavior,
expressed through political violence. As witnessed in various locations in Zambia political
violence has deep cost implications in terms of damage to property and even loss of life, not to
mention damaged relationships (Brown and Rosecrance, 1999) all of which become triggers of
conflict. Hence, an initiative which brings local people together to find solutions to their
problems, as this PAR process did, should be promoted.
This study confirms the utility of PAR in conflict prevention and resolution, which
advocates for a bottom-up approach as an alternative to other dominant modes of intervention
such as cohesive military forms of intervention. PAR and other bottom-up methods allow local
people at the grassroots to own and champion peaceful coexistence with their political
opponents. Given the ever-rising number of violent political conflicts reported, stakeholders
should consider incorporating PAR methods in their interventions to transform communities and
political players into agents of peace and peacebuilding.
In terms of new findings, the research shows that: i) majority of political cadres in Zambia
engage in violence because of their absolute ignorance on democratic principles and electoral
laws and conduct; ii) weak and biased public institutions which selectively punish wrongdoing,
mostly favoring the ruling party; iii) it is possible to positively alter (rewire) political cadres’
mindset through behavior change; iv) absence of party ideologies produces a cadre with no ethos
and values to stand by, hence their constant defection across party lines; v) abuse of vulnerable
youths by political elite who pay these youths to engage in politics of intimidation; and vi) it is
possible to bring together in one room warring political competitors to discuss national issues
even at the height of political tension. Of course, poverty, poor political leadership and endemic
corruption contributes to all these problems.
Two major contributions that come out of this research are that a bottom-up approach is
more sustainable in conflict prevention and its resolution, and that PAR can effectively be
utilized to promote positive behavior change among political players which may lead to the
desired peaceful societal interactions. As highlighted by UNESCO, “since wars begin in the
minds of men and women, it is in the minds of men and women that the defences of peace must
be constructed” (UNESCO, 1945—preamble to UNESCO’s Constitution). This study aimed at
contributing to achieving this global desire for peaceful societies.
Notes
1
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These presidents served their terms as follows: 1. David Kenneth Kaunda (24 Oct. 1964 –2 Nov.1991); 2.
Frederick Titus Chiluba (2 Nov. 1991–2 Jan 2002); 3. Levy Mwanawasa (2 Jan. 2002–19 Aug. 2008, died while
serving his second term); 4. Rupiah Bwezani Banda (2 Nov. 2008–23 Sept. 2011); 5. Michael Chilufya Sata (23
Sept. 2011–28 Oct 2014, died while serving his first term in office); and 6. Edgar Chagwa Lungu (25 Jan. 2015-??;
then 13 Sept. 2016 to date).
2

3

This refers to people injured as well as damage to private and public property.
East & north covered Eastern, Northern, Muchinga and Luapula Provinces, while south and west covered
Southern, Western Northwestern and Central Provinces. Copperbelt and Lusaka Provinces, with a large metropolitan
population, were a toss-up; parties shared votes from these locations.
5
These effects and possible solutions may apply to multiple causes of political violence.
6
President Edgar Lungu appointed this 15-member Commission in October 2016 to examine causes of political
violence before and after 11th August 2016 general elections.
7
These parties were: United Party for National Development (UPND), United National Independence Party (UNIP),
Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD), Forum for Democracy & Development (FDD), Green Party,
People’s Alliance for Change (PAC), Rainbow Party, and Democratic Alliance (DA).
8
Part III of the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ, 1996) provides for Protection of Fundamental Rights
and Freedoms of the Individual.
9
Section 11 of the Zambian Constitution, 1996, prohibits discrimination.
10
For example, in Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, Uganda, Zimbabwe, etc.
4
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